By Domenico Moro
Published by the Policy Paper series of the Centro Studi sul Federalismo
Doing European defence requires the power to do it, or a power situation that enables it. This ‘power situation’ arises from a shift in the balance of power among European States, placing the issue on the political agenda. Such shifts in the balance of power can be triggered by extraordinary events – like the fall of the Berlin Wall, which spurred monetary union – or by initiatives from European institutions, such as the Commission, or actions taken by a group of willing Member States, supported by the European Parliament. A fragile truce in Ukraine and the foreign policy of the new Trump administration could be the trigger for a European defence initiative.
As European States and institutions still lack enthusiasm to move towards an autonomous European defence, the EU’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty (henceforth ‘Atlantic Pact’) is an initiative worth considering. This step would serve as a stepping stone to what would become necessary in any case, once the EU has its own defence.
The EU’s entry into the Atlantic Pact can happen without altering existing treaties, although the formal steps required, such as ratification by the members of the Pact and, probably, the EU countries themselves, will not be easy. Opposition from countries that are not part of the EU, such as Turkey, the United Kingdom, or the United States is a possibility. Additionally, some EU countries, such as Hungary, might also be opposed.
Altiero Spinelli had already pointed out the particularity of the Atlantic Pact when he stated that “this defence organisation is institutionalised, what we have before us is not, in reality, a classical alliance, but a real military confederation, an association of States that have decided to provide jointly for the defence of certain territories”.